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FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS-
CHANGING THE BALANCE OF
MIRANDA
Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Moran v. Burbine,I the United States Supreme Court refused
to expand the scope of what constitutes a knowing and intelligent
waiver of an accused's fifth amendment 2 right to remain silent and
right to the presence of counsel as originally prescribed in Miranda
v. Arizona.3 In Moran, the Court held that the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit misconstrued the fifth amendment and
that under the dictates of Miranda the "respondent validly waived
his right to remain silent and to the presence of counsel."4 The
validity of the respondent's waiver was upheld even though the po-
lice misinformed his attorney concerning interrogation of the re-
spondent and neglected to inform the respondent of his attorney's
request to meet with him.5 In short, the Moran Court sought to
avoid obscuring Miranda's "bright line" test 6 by refusing to apply a
fact-based analysis. 7
Reasoning that the waiver of one's constitutional rights is an
individual's choice, the Moran Court held that an attorney's request
to see the defendant does not affect the validity of the defendant's
waiver of the right to counsel.8 This Note examines the Moran opin-
1 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
2 The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides in part that no person shall "be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend V.
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda Court held, in part, that the fifth amendment of
the Constitution of the United States "serves to protect persons in all settings in which
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to in-
criminate themselves." Id. at 467.
4 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.
5 Id.
6 The "bright line" test refers to the Miranda decision which imposed a set of rules
upon every police officer seeking to interrogate a person suspected of a crime who is in
custody or whose freedom has been infringed upon. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-70.
7 A fact based analysis examines the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation in order to determine whether the confession was coerced or the result of
the suspect's free will. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 384 (3d ed. 1984).
8 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.
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ions and concludes that the Court's decision adheres to the basic
underpinnings of Miranda mandating exclusion of a suspect's con-
fession absent the requisite warnings. This Note will argue, how-
ever, that the Moran court failed in its effort to maintain the
"balance" between the individual's rights and the government's
rights under Miranda. The Moran Court, by allowing deliberate de-
ception of an accused's attorney by the police has shifted the "bal-
ance" of Miranda in favor of the police and against the accused.
This Note concludes that such a shift will unduly add compelling
pressures upon suspects to confess in custodial interrogation in vio-
lation of constitutional traditions.
II. HISTORY
Prior to 1966, the Supreme Court became increasingly dis-
enchanted with the use of the voluntariness test in determining the
validity of a suspect's confession.9 The voluntariness test is a sub-
jective analysis of all the circumstances under which police obtain
incriminating statements to determine whether the statements are
uncoerced and the result of the suspect's free will.10 In Miranda, the
Court expressed its exasperation with the voluntariness test and re-
lieved the courts from considering the totality of circumstances
under which confessions were procured. 1
The Miranda Court declared that custodial interrogation by the
9 The common law requirement that a suspect's confession must be voluntary and
not the result of compulsion was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Hopt v. Utah,
110 U.S. 574 (1884). In Hopt the Court explained that a confession must be held
inadmissible
when the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of induce-
ments of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge pre-
ferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such person,
which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in reference to the charge,
deprives him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession
voluntary within the meaning of the law.
Id. at 585.
10 See, e.g., Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New"
Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MicH. L. REv. 59, 94-104 (1966)(out-
lining the history of voluntariness test). For examples of the application of the volunta-
riness test by the Supreme Court, see Hayness v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963);
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
11 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 468. See Developments in the Law--Confessions, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 935, 983-84 (1966)(illustrating how "formidable" a task it is to determine whether
a suspect made a "rational" choice to answer questions given the many factors a suspect
confronts in interrogation). See also Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the
Modern Law of Confessions, WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 293 (1975); Kamisar, What Is an "involun-
taty" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17
RUTGERS L. REv. 728, 742 (1963); Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree,
6 STAN L. REv. 411, 430-31 (1954).
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police was inherently coercive and that statements elicited from an
accused without a set of prescribed warnings would be inadmissi-
ble. 12 In its decision, the Court relied on the fifth amendment's as-
sertion that a person is protected from being compelled to be a
witness against himself.' 3 Given the Miranda Court's presumption
of compulsion, the prosecution must prove that a suspect "know-
ingly and intelligently"' 14 waived his Miranda rights before the sus-
pect's confession will be admitted into evidence.'
5
III. FACTS
Several months after the murder of Mary Jo Hickey, 16 police
officers from Cranston, Rhode Island arrested Brian Burbine and
two others in connection with an alleged breaking and entering.'
7
After Burbine refused to execute a written waiver of his Miranda
rights, Detective Ferranti questioned the other two suspects and ob-
tained statements implicating Burbine for the death of Ms. Hickey.' 8
Shortly thereafter, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Detective Ferranti
called the Providence Police to inform them of the information he
had discovered.' 9 One hour later, three officers arrived from Provi-
12 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. The warnings that must be conveyed to a suspect are:
the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation; the right to remain
silent; and the right, under certain circumstances, to terminate the interrogation. Id. at
479.
13 Id. at 439. See supra note 2.
14 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 479. The Court adopted the "knowing and intelligent"
standard from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), a case often cited for the
standard of determining when a constitutional right has been waived. See Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)(waiver of right to a speedy trial); Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S.
1 (1972)(waiver of right to counsel before entering plea of guilty); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968)(waiver of the right to confrontation); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962)(waiver of right to counsel at trial); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957)(waiver of right to be free from double jeopardy).
15 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 479. The Court asserted that the prosecution faced a
"heavy burden" in proving an effective waiver of a suspect's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. Id. at 475.
16 Ms. Hickey died three weeks after being found in a factory parking lot in Provi-
dence Rhode Island with severe injuries to her skull. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1138.
17 Id. Shortly before the arrest, a confidential informant had informed Detective Fer-
ranti, a member of the Cranston Police, that the man who murdered Ms. Hickey resided
at a certain address and answered to the name of "Butch." Id. After arresting Burbine,
Detective Ferranti discovered that Burbine lived at the designated address. Id.
18 Id. In dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the three suspects were placed in sepa-
rate rooms for questioning. Id. at 1154 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 1138. Justice Stevens stated that after discovering evidence incriminating
Burbine in Hickey's death, Ferranti returned to Burbine's room at 4:30 and asked him
"'if there was anybody that he knew by the name of Butch on the street, and he said he
was the only Butch.'" Id. at 1154 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Burbine, 451
A.2d 22, 23 (R.I. 1982)). After a brief period of questioning, Justice Stevens added that
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dence for the express purpose of interrogating Burbine about the
murder of Ms. Hickey.
20
While these events unfolded, Burbine's sister called the Public
Defenders Office to seek legal assistance for her brother.21 At the
time of her call, Burbine's sister was concerned solely with the
breaking and entering charge because she was unaware that Burbine
was a murder suspect.22 She requested to speak with Richard Cas-
parian, who had been scheduled, earlier that afternoon, to discuss
with Burbine another unrelated criminal matter.23 The attorney
who took the call was unable to reach Casparian. 24 Another public
defender assistant, Allegra Munson, was informed of Burbine's situ-
ation and of his sister's request that the office represent him.2 5
At 8:15 p.m., Munson called the Cranston police station and
requested "that her call be transfered to the detective division." 26
The conversation was as follows:
A male voice reponded with the word 'Detectives.' Ms. Munson identi-
fied herself and asked if Brian Burbine was being held; the person re-
sponded affirmatively. Ms. Munson explained to the person that
Burbine was represented by attorney Casparian who was not available;
she further stated that she would act as Burbine's legal counsel in the
event that the police intended to place him in a lineup or question
him. The unidentified person told Ms. Munson that the police would
not be questioning Burbine or putting him in a lineup and that they
were through for the night. Ms. Munson was not informed that the
Providence Police were at the Cranston police station or that Burbine
was a suspect in Mary's murder.
27
Burbine never received information of his sister's effort to retain
counsel or Munson's conversation with the Police department.28
At approximately 9:00 p.m., Burbine was brought into the in-
terrogation room where five officers were present and the first of a
Burbine was left alone "where he remained until 9:00 p.m." Id. (Stevens, J. dissent-
ing)(footnote omitted).
20 Id. at 1138-39. Justice Stevens added that one of the Providence officers
testified that, as he drove to the Cranston police station, he knew that he might not
be able to question Burbine "[i]f for some reason he didn't want to give me a state-
ment, if for some reason he chose to get an attorney and the attorney informed us
that he didn't want him to give a statement."
Id. at 1154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Record at 407).






27 Id. at 1139 (quoting State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 23-24 (R.I. 1982)).
28 Id. at 1139.
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series of interviews were conducted. 29 The detectives then read
Burbine his Miranda rights.30 They further ascertained that he un-
derstood his right to have an attorney present.31 At about 9:30 p.m.
the police obtained his signature on a waiver of rights form.32
Burbine then acknowledged his responsibility for the death of
Hickey, and recited his version of the events of her death. 33 During
this interrogation session, Burbine " '[did] not want an attorney
called or appointed for [him]' before he gave a statement. '34 Evi-
dence also revealed that Burbine had access to a phone on two sepa-
rate occasions which he did not attempt to use.3 5 Burbine
eventually signed three written statements attesting to his responsi-
bility for Hickey's death.36
Prior to trial, Burbine moved to suppress the three incriminat-
ing statements.37 At the hearing on the motion to surpress, the
court found that Burbine had received the Miranda warnings.38 The
court found further that Burbine was not coerced, threatened, nor
promised any benefit in return for his statements.3 9 The trial judge
concluded, therefore, that Burbine "knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his privilege against self-incrimination [and] his
right to counsel." 40 The trial court also found that Munson did
make the phone call4 ' but concluded "that there was no collusion or






34 Id. Justice Stevens pointed out, however, that Ferranti later testified that Burbine
was "coherent" and "incoherent" during the interrogation. Id. at 1155 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
35 Id. at 1139. Justice Stevens attacked the majority for this factual finding. Id. at
1154 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He stated that:
The Court makes its own findings about Burbine's access to a telephone during this
period. [citation omitted] No state court made such a finding, and the record con-
tains no evidence indicating whether Burbine was told he could use the phone,
whether an outside line was available without use of the police switchboard, or any
number of other possibly relevant factors.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).




40 Id. (quoting State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 24 (R.I. 1982)).
41 State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 24 (R.I. 1982). The Superior Court also found that
Burbine had "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his privilege against self-
incrimination [and] his right to counsel." Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1139. With these find-
ings, the court denied Burbine's motion to supress and held that the right to counsel is
for the defendant to assert and may not be requested by his lawyer. Id.
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attorney.' ",42 In accordance with these findings, the trial court de-
nied Burbine's motion to surpress, holding that "the constitutional
right to request the presence of an attorney belongs solely to the
defendant and may not be asserted by his lawyer."'43 The trial court
reasoned that because Burbine never requested the services of an
attorney, Munson's telephone call had no relevancy to the validity of
Burbine's waiver.
44
Burbine was subsequently convicted of first degree murder and
he appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.45 A divided
court affirmed the lower court's decision and rejected Burbine's ar-
gument that the fifth and fourteenth amendments necessitated the
suppression of the inculpatory statements. 46 In support of its con-
clusion, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island stated: "It hardly
seems conceivable that the additional information that an attorney
whom [Burbine] did not know had called the police station would
have added significantly to the quantum of information necessary
for the accused to make an informed decision as to waiver." 47 Irre-
spective of the value this information may have had to Burbine, the
court held that "the principles of Miranda place the assertion of the
right to remain silent and the right to counsel upon the accused, and
not upon benign third parties...." 48 In addition, the court affirmed
the trial court's finding that the record did not indicate conspiracy
or collusion because the two different police departments were op-
erating in the Cranston station at the time of Munson's phone call.
49
After the United States District Court of Rhode Island denied
Burbine's writ of habeas corpus, 50 Burbine filed an appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 51 The appeal
alleged that his fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendment rights were
violated.52 The court of appeals did not reach Burbine's sixth and
fourteenth amendment claims. The appellate court, however, re-
versed the district court's denial of the petition for the writ of
habeas corpus on two grounds. 53 The appellate court stated that
the police's failure to tell Burbine that an attorney had called offer-
42 Id. (quoting Burbine, 451 A.2d at 24).
43 Id. (quoting Burbine, 451 A.2d at 28).
44 Id. at 1139-40 (quoting Burbine, 451 A.2d at 28).
45 Id. at 1140 (quoting Burbine, 451 A.2d at 22).
46 Id. (quoting Burbine, 451 A.2d at 29).
47 Burbine, 451 A.2d at 29.
48 Id. at 28.
49 Id. at 29 n.5.
50 Burbine v. Moran, 589 F. Supp. 1245, 1246 (D. R.I. 1984).





ing assistance, along with the misleading advice given to the attor-
ney, "vitiates any claim that a waiver of counsel was knowing and
voluntary" and violated Burbine's fifth amendment right to counsel
and his privilege against self-incrimination. 54 The court of appeals
concluded that the record revealed that it was Burbine, and not the
police, who spontaneously initiated the conversation that led to the
first and most damaging confession. 55 The court of appeals also
found that the record supported a finding that the police's refusal to
tell Burbine of Munson's call was "deliberate or reckless irresponsi-
bility." 56 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari57 "to
decide whether a pre-arraignment confession preceded by an other-
wise valid waiver must be suppressed either because the police mis-
informed an inquiring attorney about their plans concerning the
suspect or because they failed to inform the suspect of the attorney's
efforts to reach him."
58
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In Moran v. Burbine,59 a divided United States Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court holding that the court of appeals erred
in concluding that Burbine's fifth amendment rights had been vio-
lated.60 Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion. She
stressed that the constitutional right to request an attorney lies ex-
clusively with the defendant 6' and added that the right to counsel
should not be asserted by an attorney whose presence was never
requested by the suspect.62 Justice O'Connor relied heavily on her
interpretation of the underpinnings of Miranda.63 She reasoned,
furthermore, that the facts of Moran did not warrant an expansion of
police duties to include advising a suspect of an attorney's commu-
nication, thereby blemishing the clarity of Miranda.
64
Justice O'Connor began by briefly examining how Miranda pro-
tects an individual's fifth amendment rights.65 Recognizing the
54 Id. at 187.
55 Id. at 180.
56 Id. at 185.
57 Moran v. Burbine, 105 S. Ct. 2319.
58 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1140.
59 106 S. Ct. 1135.
60 Id. at 1145.
61 Id. at 1142.
62 Id.
63 See Id. at 1141.
64 Id. at 1143.
65 Id. at 1140-41.
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"compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not other-
wise do so freely," 66 Justice O'Connor stated that Miranda imposed
the duty on those questioning a suspect to "inform [a suspect] of his
rights to remain silent and to 'have counsel present... if [he] so
desires.' "167 In addition, Justice O'Connor stated that "Miranda re-
quires that the police respect the accused's decision to exercise the
rights outlined in the warnings."
68
The standard for determining the validity of a waiver, asserted
Justice O'Connor; was first stated in Johnson v. Zerbst 69 and later
adopted in Miranda.70 This standard incorporates the proposition
that a " 'defendant may waive effectuation' of the rights conveyed in
the warnings 'provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently.' "71 Justice O'Connor stated that only if this stan-
dard is met given the " 'totality of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation'" may a court properly conclude that the waiver
was valid. 72 The record, according to Justice O'Connor, clearly re-
vealed the validity of Burbine's waiver of his rights to remain silent
and of the presence of counsel. 73
Justice O'Connor agreed with the court of appeals' finding that
the waiver was voluntary.74 She rejected, however, the court of ap-
peals' conclusion that the failure of the police to inform Burbine of
66 Id. at 1140 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
67 Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-70 (1966)). Justice O'Connor
added that Miranda required that the police, before questioning a suspect, "must fully
apprise the suspect of the state's intention to use [the suspect's] statements to secure a
conviction." Id.
68 Id. at 1141.
69 304 U.S. 458, 464, (1938)(waiver must be intelligent, and whether there was such
a waiver must depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, including back-
ground, experience, and conduct of the accused).
70 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.
71 Id. at 1141 (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor added that the inquiry as to the
validity of a waiver requires an examination of two factors:
First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it
was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or
deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it.
Id. (citation omitted).
72 Id. (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).
73 Id.
74 Id. Referring to the court of appeals, Justice O'Connor stated that "the record is
devoid of any suggestion that the police resorted to physical or psychological pressure
to elicit the statements." Id. (citing Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178, 184 (1st Cir.
1985)). Indeed, Justice O'Connor asserted, it was not the police, but rather Burbine
who spontaneously began the conversation which illicited the most damaging testimony.
Id. Justice O'Connor added that the record revealed that Burbine fully understood his
1986] 673
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Munson's phone call was "deliberate or reckless" conduct which
would invalidate an otherwise proper waiver.75 In support of the
majority's reversal, Justice O'Connor reasoned that "[e]vents occur-
ring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to
him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and
knowingly relinquish a constitutional right." 76 While conceding
that it may be true that information that a lawyer had contacted the
police may have affected Burbine's decision to confess, Justice
O'Connor stated that the Court has "never read the Constitution to
require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to
help him calibrate his self interest in deciding whether to speak or
stand by his rights."'77 The proper analysis, according to Justice
O'Connor, is that
[o]nce it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his
rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute
and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the state's intention to
use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and
the waiver is valid as a matter of law.
78
Justice O'Connor also rejected the court of appeals' conclusion
that the failure of the police to inform Burbine of the attorney's tele-
phone call rose to a level of culpability that should have affected
whether a waiver of Burbine's Miranda rights was properly ob-
tained.79 Justice O'Connor emphasized, moreover, that "even de-
liberate deception of an attorney could not possibly affect a
suspect's decision to waive his Miranda rights unless he were at least
rights provided in the Miranda warnings and the consequences he would face if he chose
to waive them. Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1142. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985)(information
about the nature and quality of the evidence and consequences of a suspect's decision
need not be told); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977)(no require-
ment of warning about "target" status as prerequisite to noncustodial interrogation pre-
ceding a grandjury). Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. 366, 367 (1985)(no requirement to
inform suspect of his parole eligibility date); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769
(1970)(an intelligent waiver does not depend on whether all advice given by the sus-
pect's attorney was correct when examined post-hoc). In a footnote, Justice O'Connor
sharply rejected the dissent's argument that the fifth amendment "right to counsel" re-
quires the police to inform a suspect of any other matters that may help him make his
decision of whether to speak or to remain silent. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142 n.1. The fifth
amendment, asserted Justice O'Connor, requires only "that the police inform the sus-
pect of his right to representation and honor his request that the interrogation cease
until his attorney is present. Id. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n.10 (1975).
78 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142 (footnote omitted).
79 Id. Justice O'Connor further questioned whether the court of appeals was free to
make a conclusion that the police's conduct was " 'deliberate or reckless irresponsibil-
ity.' " Id. (quoting Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178, 185 (1st Cir. 1985)).
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aware of the incident."' 80 Justice O'Connor added that absent con-
spiracy or collusion, the failure of the police to inform Burbine of
the phone call from his attorney, while objectionable as a matter of
ethics, has no relevancy to the constitutional validity of a waiver un-
less "it deprives a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to
understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of aban-
doning them." 8' Justice O'Connor asserted that Burbine compre-
hended all of the information the police were required to convey
under the dictates of Miranda.8 2
Justice O'Connor then rejected Burbine's argument that the
conduct of the Providence Police was so adverse to the fifth amend-
ment underpinnings of Miranda that the conviction should be re-
versed so as to condemn the police's behavior. 83 Justice O'Connor
stated that Burbine's contention "ignores the underlying purpose of
the Miranda rules," because Miranda already "strikes the proper bal-
ance between society's legitimate law enforcement interests and the
protection of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights."8 4 Justice
O'Connor asserted, in addition, that interpreting Miranda as forbid-
ding police deception of a lawyer" 'would cut [the decision] com-
pletely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale.' "85 The
purpose of Miranda warnings, Justice O'Connor argued,
is to dissipate the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation and,
in so doing, guard against abridgement of the suspect's Fifth Amend-
ment rights. Clearly, a rule that focuses on how the police treat an
attorney-conduct that has no relevance at all-to the degree of com-
pulsion experienced by the defendant during interrogation-would ig-
nore both Miranda's mission and its only source of legitimacy.8 6
Justice O'Connor next stressed the clarity and ease of applying
the Miranda standard.8 7 If police are required to inform a suspect of
80 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142. Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 481
(1964) (incriminating statements excluded where the suspect was told, incorrectly, that
his attorney "'didn't want to see' him").
81 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1143.
84 Id.
85 Id. (quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 (1976)). Justice
O'Connor noted that it is well established that "[t]he... .Miranda warnings are 'not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that
the [suspect's] right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.'" Id. (quot-
ing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 444 (1974)).
86 Id. at 1143.
87 Id. at 1143. One of the advantages of the Miranda doctrine is the clarity of the rule
that suspects must be given warnings before being interrogated while in custody. Id. See
also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
1986] 675
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an attorney's efforts to contact him, Justice O'Connor reasoned,
then the simplicity of applying Miranda would diminish without
greatly reducing the compulsion suspects confront in custodial in-
terrogations.8 8 A limitless panoply of questions would arise, Justice
O'Connor continued, when a court examines the validity of a sus-
pect's waiver.89 Furthermore, the police would have difficulty know-
ing how to conduct a custodial interrogation.90 Such a "Pandora's
box," according to Justice O'Connor, should be avoided.91
Justice O'Connor concluded that while an individual may bene-
fit if the police inform him of an attorney's attempt to contact him,
such a benefit would be minimal.92 Justice O'Connor reasoned that
the benefit was outweighed by the possible shift in the balance Mi-
randa sought between effective law enforcement and an individual's
ability to overcome the inherently coercive atmosphere of an inter-
rogation.93 Miranda, Justice O'Connor added, requires that a sus-
pect fully comprehend his rights to remain silent and his rights to an
attorney. 94 Justice O'Connor stressed that demanding the police to
inform a suspect of an attorney's inquiry puts an unwarranted
"handicap" on the police in their investigatory efforts. 95
Acknowledging that her reluctance to expand Miranda was con-
dissenting in part)(admission of evidence secured without the benefit of Miranda warn-
ings lessens the clarity of Miranda); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)("Mi-
randa's holding has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to
what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation.
88 See Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1143.
89 Id. Among those questions Justice O'Connor believed would act as legions on the
clarity of Miranda are the following:
To what extent should the police be held accountable for knowing that the accused
has counsel? Is it enough that someone in the station house knows or must the
interrogating officer himself know of counsel's effort to contact the suspect? Do
counsel's efforts to talk to the suspect concerning one criminal investigation trigger
the obligation to inform the defendant before interrogation may proceed on a
wholly separate matter?
Id.
90 Id. at 1143, 1144 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979).
91 See Id.
92 Id. at 1144.
93 Id. at 1144 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 255 (1973)). Citing
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977), Justice O'Connor stressed the impor-
tance of obtaining confessions. Id. at 186. She also noted that New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 654 (1984) reaffirmed Miranda's recognition that custodial interrogation is
"inherently coercive." Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1144. Justice O'Connor reasoned that "Mi-
randa attempted to reconcile these opposing concerns by giving the defendant the power
to exert some control over the course of the interrogation. Declining to adopt the more
extreme position that the actual presence of a lawyer was necessary to dispel the coer-
cion inherent in custodial interrogation . Id. (emphasis original).




trary to other authorities, 96 Justice O'Connor asserted that "our in-
terpretive duties go well beyond deferring to the numerical
preponderance of lower court decisions or to the subconstitutional
recommendations of even so esteemed a body as the American Bar
Association." 97 In addition, Justice O'Connor qualified her holding,
stating that "[n]othing we say today disables the States from adopt-
ing different requirements for the conduct of its employees and offi-
cials as a matter of state law."98
Following her discussion of Burbine's fifth amendment argu-
ment, Justice O'Connor addressed Burbine's sixth amendment con-
tentions concerning exclusion of his three confessions. 99 Justice
O'Connor conceded that, absent a waiver, a suspect has a sixth
amendment right to counsel after being formally charged'0 0 and
that the police may not obstruct the efforts of a suspect's attorney to
act as a "medium" between the state and the suspect.' 0 ' Justice
O'Connor noted, however, that the interrogation of Burbine took
place before formal judicial proceedings commenced.' 0 2 Moreover,
Justice O'Connor was not persuaded that decisions subsequent to
Escobedo and Miranda stand "for the proposition that the Sixth
Amendment right, in any of its manifestations, applies prior to the
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings."' 1 3 Escobedo, Justice
O'Connor stated, was originally decided as a sixth amendment
case. ' 0 4 In retrospect, however, the Supreme Court has consistently
viewed Escobedo not as a constitutional right to counsel case but as a
96 See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
97 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1144.
98 Id. at 1145.
99 Id.
100 Id. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 183 (1984) (A suspect is not consti-
tutionally entitled to the appointment of counsel while he is in administrative segrega-
tion and before any adversary judicial proceedings had been initiated against him.);
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 687 (1972)("Showup after arrest, but before the initiation
of any adversary criminal proceeding[,] whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment[,] ... is not a criminal prosecution at
which the accused, as a matter of absolute right, is entitled to counsel."); Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 390 (1972) (right to counsel is triggered at or after the time that
judicial proceedings have been initiated).
101 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1145. See Maine v. Moulton, 106 S.Ct. 477, 485 (1985)(sixth
amendment imposes affirmative obligation on police to respect and preserve accused's
right to counsel); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1972).
102 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1145.
103 Id. Justice O'Connor also noted that the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that
no attorney-client relationship existed between the respondent and Ms. Munson. Id. at
1145 n.3. Furthermore, even if the Court accepted the existence of the attorney-client
relationship, Justice O'Connor stated that the Court would reject the assertion that the
attorney-client relationship "triggers" the sixth amendment right to an attorney. Id.
104 Id. at 1145-46.
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guarantee against self-incrimination case. 10 5
Justice O'Connor criticized Burbine's understanding of the
sixth amendment. 0 6 According to Justice O'Connor, the sixth
amendment does not wrap "a protective cloak around the attorney-
client relationship."10 7 In addition, Justice O'Connor concluded
that "it makes little sense to say that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches at different times depending on the fortuity of
whether the suspect or his family happens to have retained counsel
prior to interrogation."'' 08 Justice O'Connor asserted that the pur-
pose of the sixth amendment "is to assure that in any 'criminal
prosecutio[n],' the accused shall not be left to his own devices in
facing the 'prosecutorial forces of organized society.' "109
Justice O'Connor then reasserted "that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not attach until after the initiation of formal
charges." 110 Thus, Justice O'Connor reasoned that despite the fact
that the presence of counsel would help a suspect during interroga-
tion or other "critical" stages before formal judicial proceedings,"'
the interrogation, standing alone, does not invoke a constitutional
right to counsel. 112
Finally, Justice O'Connor focused on Burbine's claim that he
was deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment."13 While asserting that the Court does not ap-
prove all forms of police misconduct, 114 Justice O'Connor
105 Id. at 1146. Supporting this interpretation of Escobedo, Justice O'Connor cited
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). The Court in Johnson declared that since
"Escobedo and Miranda guard against the possibility of unreliable statements in every in-
stance of in-custody interrogation, they encompass situations in which the danger is not
necessarily as great as when the accused is subjected to overt and obvious coercion."
Johnson, 384 U.S. at 730. See also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 n.5 (1984);
Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 217-18 n.94 (1980).
106 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1146. Burbine claimed that the police obstructed his sixth
amendment attorney-client relationship. Id. at 1145.
107 Id. at 1146.
108 Id.
109 Id. (citations omitted).
11o Id.
"'1 Id. at 1147. Justice O'Connor referred to a pre-indictment lineup as one of these
critical events. See Id. She noted, however, that representation by an attorney during a
pre-trial line up was at issue in Kirby. Id. In Kirby, the Court rejected the argument that
such an event triggers the sixth amendment right to counsel. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689 (1972).
112 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1147.
113 Id. Burbine argued that the conveying of false information to his attorney should
be considered violative of the due process standard articulated in Synder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)(Police behavior should be condemned if it violates the
"tradition and conscience of our people"). Id.
114 See Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1147. Justice O'Connor castigated Justice Stevens for
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concluded that the facts of Moran demonstrate that "the challenged
conduct falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the sen-
sibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the
criminal processes of the States." 1 15 Accordingly, the Court re-
versed the court of appeals and held that Burbine's three inculpa-
tory statements were improperly excluded.
116
B. DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's opinion. 1 7 He care-
fully outlined the facts of the case and concluded that Burbine's
waiver of his constitutional rights was invalid. In addition, he at-
tacked the majority's assumption that affirming the appellate court's
decision would blur the clarity of Miranda.
Justice Stevens first chastised the majority's departure from the
Supreme Court's previous holding that our justice system is "an ac-
cusatorial and not an inquisitorial system."" r8 Justice Stevens then
outlined the consequences of the majority's opinion. Noting that a
lawyer contacted by the suspect's family may act on behalf of the
suspect," 9 Justice Stevens concluded that the majority opinion
asserting that the Court has approved of all forms of police conduct. Id. Justice
O'Connor argued that Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) effectively foreclosed the
dissent's major premise that Miranda necessitates that the police provide the suspect
with all the relevant information he may need to decide to speak or invoke his constitu-
tional right to remain silent. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1147 n.4. Justice O'Connor also cited
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977)(The fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies to grand jury proceedings but "the Constitution does
not prohibit every element which influences a criminal suspect to make incriminating
admissions"). Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1147 n.4. Justice O'Connor also condemned justice
Stevens for his "agency" theory, which postulates that the deception of an attorney can
be equated with a deception of his client. Id. Justice Steven's agency theory, asserted
Justice O'Connor, "entirely disregards the elemental and established proposition that
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is, by hypothesis, a personal one that
can only be invoked by the individual whose testimony is being compelled." Id. Justice
O'Connor also strongly criticized the dissent's interpretation of Miranda. Id. As stated
in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), "the interrogation must cease until an attor-
ney is present only '[ilf the individual states that he wants an attorney.'" Mosley, 423
U.S. at 104 n.10 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)). Therefore,
Justice O'Connor stated, the dissent was mistaken when it claimed the suspect's right to
an attorney began at the initiation of the interrogation. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1147 n.4.
Finally, Justice O'Connor claimed that the dissent was mistaken when it suggested that
the majority supported police deception. Id. Justice O'Connor asserted, it is "simply
wrong" to claim that Miranda as written mandates the exclusion of Burbine's confession.
Id.
115 Id. at 1148.
116 Id.
117 Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent.
118 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1148 (Stevens,J., dissenting)(quoting Miller v. Fenton, 106 S.
Ct. 445, 449 (1985)).
119 Id. at 1148 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sanctions the deception of a suspect.1 20 Withholding information
from the suspect, according to Justice Stevens, is justified by the ma-
jority because:
Although the information would affect the client's assertion of his
rights, the client's actions in ignorance of the availability of his attor-
ney are voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; additionally, society's in-
terest in apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing criminals
outweighs the suspect's interest in information regarding his attor-
ney's efforts to communicate with him. 1
2 '
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority's emphasis on the states'
need to interrogate suspects is gained at the expense of losing
"those liberties and rights" this nation gives to suspects "that distin-
guishes this society from most others."'
122
Justice Stevens then stated that the majority's conclusion ig-
nored the Court's repeated concern about incommunicado custo-
dial interrogation. 123 Justice Stevens contended, furthermore, that
the police deception violated the American Bar Association's Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice 124 and "completely rejects an entire body
of law on the subject."' 125 These cases,126 justice Stevens asserted,
stand for the proposition that the "police may not interfere with
communicatons between an attorney and the client whom they are
questioning."'1 27 In the case at bar, Justice Stevens asserted that the
majority "flatly rejects" this proposition.'
28
Justice Stevens then reiterated and added to the factual record
concerning the respondent's incriminating statements 129 and con-
cluded that "the failure to inform Burbine of the call from his attor-
ney makes the subsequent waiver of his constitutional rights
invalid."' 30 Justice Stevens reasoned that there is a presumption
against the validity of waivers and that the heavy burden of proving
a valid waiver of one's Miranda rights rests with the government.'
3 '
120 See Id. at 1148 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 1148-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 1149 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 1150 (Stevens,J., dissenting). See also id. at 1150 n.9 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 1151. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE § 5-5.1 (2d Ed. 1980).
125 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1151 (Stevens,J, dissenting). See Id. at 1151 n.10 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
126 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
127 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 1152-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 See supra notes 18, 19, 20, 34, 35 and accompanying text.
130 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1157 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens summarized the following cases to
support the presumption that since interrogations are inherently coercive, the burden of
proof is a heavy one: Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)("courts indulge in
every reasonable presumption against waiver"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475
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This heavy burden of proof, Justice Stevens maintained, should be
measured on a case-by-case examination of the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the waiver13 2 with a strict presumption
against the validity of a suspect's waiver.13 3 Thus, according to the
dissent, there should be a strict presumption against the validity of a
statement such as Burbine's if the police "threatened, tricked, or
cajoled" the suspect.1 34 Justice Stevens asserted that the mistate-
ments made by the police and the concealment of the fact that
Burbine's sister had retained an attorney were indistinguishable
from the "threats"or "trickery" referred to in Miranda.1
35
Justice Stevens admonished the majority for making a false
comparison.1 36 The majority compared a suspect faced with the
same circumstances as Burbine with "the same defendant... had a
lawyer not telephoned the police station."13 7 Justice Stevens as-
serted that Miranda requires an assessment of police conduct and of
the weight the suspect gave to that conduct in making his decision to
waive his constitutional rights. s38 The appropriate comparison,
stated Justice Stevens, "is between a suspect in Burbine's position
and a suspect who is otherwise tricked and deceived into a waiver of
his rights."13 9
(1966)("Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under
which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corrobo-
rated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is
rightly on its shoulders");Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)(" 'courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constituitonal rights and
*. . we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights' ") (footnotes
omitted). Id. at 1157 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 1157 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens referred to Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1978)(per
se rule is not acceptable; the question of waiver requires an examination of the particu-
lar facts and circumstances surrounding the case); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
835 (1975)(must recognize that accused managed his own defense when determining
whether his waiver was made "knowingly and intelligently").
133 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1157 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that Mi-
randa and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), established that if a suspect is not
given certain warnings or:
if police initiate questioning after the defendant has invoked his right to counsel...
the waiver is invalid as a matter of law even if evidence overwhelmingly establishes,
as a matter of fact, that "a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced,
that he at all times knew that he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he
was aware of the state's intention to use his statement to secure a conviction.
Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1157 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 1158 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476
(1966)).
135 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 See id. at 1158 n.39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
138 Id. at 1158 n.39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Before concluding that Burbine's waiver was invalid, Justice
Stevens questioned the majority's refusal to address the numerous
state court decisions confronting similar types of police decep-
tion. 140 Justice Stevens suggested that the state courts, unlike the
majority, "realized that attorney communication to the police about
the client is an event that has a direct 'bearing' on the knowing and
intelligent waiver of constitutional rights."' 14 1 Indeed, Justice Ste-
vens reasoned, the police's action was "not simply a failure to pro-
vide 'useful' information; rather, it [was an] affirmative police
interference in a communication between an attorney and a sus-
pect."1 42 Such "affirmative" police behavior violated "settled prin-
ciples about construing waivers of constitutional rights and about
the need for strict presumptions in custodial interrogations, as well
as a plain reading of the Miranda opinion itself."'143
Justice Stevens then addressed the majority's alternative argu-
ment claiming that the careful "balance" of Miranda would be jeop-
ardized by requiring the police to inform a suspect of his attorney's
efforts to communicate with him. 144 Justice Stevens concluded that
the majority's balancing approach was "misguided." 145 Justice Ste-
vens conceded, however, that requiring the police to inform sus-
pects of an attorney's communication would decrease the frequency
of confessions. 146 The cost society incurs by decreasing the fre-
quency of confessions is "the same cost that this Court has repeat-
edly found necessary to preserve the character of our free society
and our rejection of an inquisitorial system."' 14 7
Justice Stevens maintained that "the assumed right of the police
to interrogate a suspect is no right at all; at best, it is a mere privi-
lege terminable at the will of the suspect.' 148 Justice Stevens sug-
gested that when the majority referred to "costs" its apprehensions
140 See id. at 1159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 1160 n.42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 1160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 1161 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964)(defendant's confession excluded when he was not permitted to meet and consult
with his attorney, and his attorney was similarly not permitted to see him); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480-81 (1966)("An attorney may advise his client not to talk to
police until he has had an opportunity to investigate the case, or he may wish to be
present with his client during any police questioning. In doing so an attorney is merely
exercising.., good professional judgment. ); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200
(1979)(confession obtained after arrest without probable cause was inadmissible; the
police do not have a "right" to take a suspect into custody and question him).
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were misplaced. 149 "Cost," according to Justice Stevens, is simply
an assertion of "the rights that are afforded by our system of crimi-
nal justice."' 50 The majority's conclusion, Justice Stevens argued,
was simply a failure "to appreciate the value of the liberty that an
accusatorial system seeks to protect."'' 1
Justice Stevens then focused on the majority's argument that
the "clarity" of Miranda would be undermined if the police were re-
quired to advise a suspect of an attorney's attempt to reach him.
152
According to Justice Stevens, the additional questions 153 that may
result from requiring the police to inform a suspect of an attorney's
request to communicate with him are easily answered. 154 Justice
Stevens added, furthermore, that the clarity of Miranda is not exclu-
sively intended to serve the police but rather is "intended to provide
adequate guidance to the person in custody who is being asked to
waive the protections afforded by the Constitution."' 155
According to Justice Stevens, attorney Munson was acting as
Burbine's counsel at the time she telephoned the Cranston Police
Station. 156 Based on principles of agency law, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that "the police deception of Munson was tantamount to de-
149 See Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 1162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153 Justice Stevens outlined the questions and his responses as follows:
(1) "To what extent should the police be held accountable for knowing that the
accused has counsel?" The simple answer is that police should be held accountable
to the extent that the attorney or the suspect informs the police of the
representation.
(2) "Is it enough that someone in the station house knows, or must the interrogat-
ing officer himself know of counsel's efforts to contact the suspect?" Obviously,
police should be held responsible for getting a message of this importance from one
officer to another.
(3) "Do counsel's efforts to talk to the suspect concerning one criminal investiga-
tion trigger the obligation to inform the defendant before interrogation may pro-
ceed on a wholly separate matter?" As the facts of this case forcefully demonstrate,
the answer is "yes."
Id. at 1162 n.46 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
154 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 1162 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens illustrated how the majority's
interpretation of clarity in Miranda is one-sided by citing Pfeil v. Rogers, 106 S. Ct. 53
(1985) and Barrett v. United States Customs Service, 106 S. Ct. 393 (1985) as examples
of the difficulty the Court has had in determining whether a suspect's resources are
adequate to afford an attorney. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1162 n.47 (StevensJ, dissenting).
Additionally, Justice Stevens referred to Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634
(1986); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965), to demonstrate the difficulty suspects have in convincing themselves that their
silence will not be construed as an admission of guilt. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1162 n.47
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1163 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ception of Burbine himself."1 57 Misleading attorney Munson and
failing to inform Burbine of the attorney's communication, Justice
Stevens maintained, was relevant in determining whether Burbine
validly waived his Miranda rights, because these actions limited the
protection to which Burbine was entitled. 158 Justice Stevens stated
that such a conclusion is not inconsistent with Escobedo v. Illinois 1
59
where the Court held that the police cannot deny attorneys access to
their incarcerated clients. 160
Finally, Justice Stevens ridiculed the majority for its cursory
analysis of whether the facts exhibited a violation of Burbine's right
to due process.' 6 ' He asserted that the Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that under certain circumstances interrogation techniques
will be condemned as offensive to the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 162 Justice Stevens concluded that the ma-
jority's analysis of due process was faulty because they applied a
"shock the conscience" test 163 rather than focusing on whether the
criminal justice system operated with fairness, integrity, and hon-
esty. 164 These three elements of fairness, integrity and honesty,
concluded Justice Stevens, were tarnished by the police's interfer-
ence with communication between Burbine and his attorney and
consequently revealed a violation of Burbine's right to due
process. 1
65
VI. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Moran v. Burbine exemplifies the Supreme Court's recent efforts
157 Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting). Such a conclusion, declared Justice Stevens, is derived
from the courts decision in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405 (1977)(the Court
concluded that the suspect "had effectively asserted his right to counsel by having se-
cured attorneys at both ends of an automobile trip, both of whom, acting as his agents,
had made clear to the police that no interrogation was to occur during the journey").
Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1163 n.49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 See Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1163 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
160 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1164 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161 See Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1165 n.62 (Stevens,J., dissenting). See Miller v. Fenton, 106 S.
Ct. 445 (1985)(due process clause of fourteenth amendment bars the admission of a
confession coerced by a detective pretending to be sympathetic to the accused's plight);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)(warrantless search of suspect's apartment vio-
lated fourteenth amendment due process clause and was not permissible simply because
a homicide had occured there); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967)(per
curiam) (violation of due process clause of fourteenth amendment to admit confession
into evidence obtained when suspect was still in pain in a prison hospital and under the
influence of drugs).
163 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1165 (StevensJ, dissenting).
164 Id.
165 See id. at 1166.
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to contain the expansion of a suspect's Miranda rights which oc-
curred during the early years of the Burger Court. 166 In deciding
fifth amendment self-incrimination questions, courts must balance
the interests of protecting society from crime against preserving in-
dividual constitutional liberties. 167 In Moran, the Court adhered to
the basic holding of Miranda which mandates the exclusion of a sus-
pect's confession absent the requisite warnings. The Court, how-
ever, departed from the underlying values of Miranda and the fifth
amendment in an apparent attempt to ease the burden on police in
their efforts to obtain voluntary confessions.
Miranda and the fifth amendment values underlying it represent
the Court's efforts to preserve the accusatorial nature of the crimi-
nal justice system while simultaneously limiting the compelling
pressures an individual faces to confess.' 68 Miranda seeks to insure
that a suspect makes a rational and unfettered choice.' 69 The Mi-
randa Court ruled that custodial interrogation is "inherently coer-
cive" and that an absolute right of counsel is "indispensable" to the
protection of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.1 70 The Miranda Court further reasoned that an attorney's
presence emphasizes a suspect's right to remain silent in a manner
that formalistic warnings by an adversarial party cannot. 71 The
presence of counsel, according to Miranda, not only assures a sus-
pect of informed advice, but also reduces the likelihood that a con-
fession will be involuntary, untrustworthy, or inaccurately reported
at trial.
172
166 See Moran v. Burbine, 72 A.B.A.J. 58, 61 (Jan. 1986). For a discussion of the
Court's recent trend regarding the Miranda doctrine, see Note, Fifth Amendment-Fifth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The assertion and Subsequent Waiver of the Right to Counsel, 74J.
GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1315 (1983). See also Grossman and Lane, Miranda: The Ero-
sion of a Doctrine, 62 Cm. B. REC. 250 (1981); Sonenshein, Miranda and The Burger Court:
Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 405 (1982); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in
the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99 (1977).
167 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966).
168 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70. "Our aim is to assure that the individuals' right to
choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation
process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation,
cannot itself suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their
rights." Id. See also Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule--A
Critique, 35 HASTINGs LJ. 429, 453 ("requiring the police to inform suspects of their
right to remain silent, the Miranda Court sought to guarantee that the accusatorial safe-
guards were not rendered meaningless by police interrogation practices").
169 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70.





Miranda, therefore, developed a prophylactic rule' 73 requiring
an effective means of ensuring a suspect's right of access to counsel.
While a prescribed set of warnings are a required prerequisite to a
"voluntary," "knowing," and "intelligent" waiver, the Miranda
Court noted that the examination of the validity of a waiver does not
conclude there. 174 The final test, according to the Miranda Court, is
whether "any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or
cajoled into a waiver will.., show the defendant did not voluntarily
waive his privilege."
1 75
Justice O'Connor was incorrect for several reasons in conclud-
ing that attorney Munson's attempt to contact Burbine and the fail-
ure of the Cranston Police to inform Burbine of the attorney's
attempt were unimportant in the consideration of whether Burbine
knowingly relinquished his constitutional right. 176 As the American
Bar Association stated in its amicus curiae brief:
[i]t will often be highly important to the arrested individual to know
not only that he has a theoretical right to have some lawyer present at
an indefinite time in the future but that a specific lawyer has already
been retained for him by his family and is attempting to contact
him.' 77
Knowledge that an attorney has advised the police not to ques-
tion the suspect without his attorney present would better illustrate
to a suspect the potential ramifications of an uncounseled waiver of
his rights. Indeed, it is persuasive that the majority of states have
declared that under facts similar to Moran, the information witheld
by the police is considered "vital" and consequently the suspect's
waiver of his right to counsel is not "voluntary," "knowing," and
"intelligent." 178
Justice O'Connor admitted that knowing an attorney had con-
tacted the police station on Burbine's behalf would have been useful
to the respondent.' 79 She concluded, however, that the Constitu-
173 See Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy,
80 Nw. U.L. REV. 100, 106-11 (1985).
174 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
175 Id. (emphasis added).
176 See Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142.
177 Brief Amicus Curiae (American Bar Association) for Respondent at 10, Moran v.
Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986)(No. 84-1485).
178 See Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 685-87 (1983); People v. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179,
188, 442 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (1982); State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274, 1278 (La.
1982); State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 72, 602 P.2d 272, 278 (1979); State v. Jones, 19
Wash. App. 850, 853, 578 P.2d 71, 73 (1978)("To pass up an abstract offer to call some
unknown lawyer is very different from refusing to talk with an identified attorney actually
able to provide at least initial assistance and advise .... A suspect indifferent to the first
offer may well react quite differently to the second.").
179 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142.
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tion does not require the police to provide a suspect with all of the
useful information available for him to make a decision to waive his
rights.18
0
While Justice O'Connor may have been justified in concluding
that a suspect is not entitled to all information, Burbine merely
wanted to avoid reckless misleading by the police.' 8 ' The police ad-
mittedly should not be required to provide all relevant information
to an accused, but the police should not be permitted, as Moran al-
lows, to withold, in a deceptive manner, crucial information. Such
police created deception was a subtle method of compelling
Burbine to act with an erroneous comprehension of the actual situa-
tion.' 8 2 As Justice Stevens urged, "trickery" or "cajolery" vitiates
the requirements of a "voluntary," "knowing," and "intelligent"
waiver.' 83 Consequently, there is no reason to distinguish between
police deception and police omission given that both bear on the
wisdom of a suspect's choice to waive counsel. 18
4
In addition, it is equally unpersuasive to argue, as Justice
O'Connor did, that events that occur outside the interrogation are
irrelevant. It may appear logical to conclude that the test of validity
of a waiver is to examine whether an individual who waives his right
to counsel without a friend or family member ever retaining counsel
is any different from a suspect waiving his right to counsel without
being told counsel has been retained. Both defendants have the
same amount of information and both have the same right to exer-
cise their right to counsel. Providing equal information, however,
does not authorize discriminatory treatment by the police. Indeed,
the Supreme Court of California recently refused to follow Moran,
noting that "[t]he doctrine of equal protection is society's shield
against discriminatory treatment by the authorities. It is not a sword
with which the authorities may deprive the accused of his counsel's
180 Id.
181 Id. The ruling of the First Circuit stated:
Deliberate or reckless misleading of an attorney, who has a legitimate, profession-
ally ethical interest in a suspect in custody and who expresses to the police a desire
to be present at any interrogation of the suspect, combined with a police failure to
communicate that exchange to the suspect, is more than one factor in the calculus
of waiver. This combination of circumstances clearly vitiates any claim that a waiver
of counsel was knowing and voluntary.
Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178, 187 (1st Cir. 1985).
182 See Brief Amicus Curiae (National Association of Trial Lawyers) for Respondent at
10-12, Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1966)(No. 84-1485)(outlining further support
for the contention that the information witheld from Burbine was material as to the
validity of his constitutional waiver).
183 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1157-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




Justice O'Connor's concern with vitiating the "ease" and "clar-
ity" of Miranda's application is not a sufficient justification for her
holding. 186 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor provided little justifica-
tion for her conclusion that requiring the police to inform an arres-
tee of an attorney's efforts to communicate with him "would work a
substantial and... inappropriate shift in the subtle balance struck
in [the Miranda] decision."'
' 87
Clearly, a requirement that the suspect be informed of his attor-
ney's communication would add some additional burden to the po-
lice. Justice O'Connor, however, feared that such a requirement
would tarnish the "clarity" of Miranda or greatly off-set the balance
provided by Miranda so as to make the burden on the police unwar-
ranted.188 Such a fear is unfounded for several reasons.
First, the appellate court ruling was very narrow. The appellate
court held that when an attorney-client relationship exists, the attor-
ney and his client must not be affirmatively misled by the police.' 8 9
Thus, under the rationale of the appellate court, the police would
simply be required to act honestly and responsibly toward the attor-
ney and his accused client. Such a burden is not substantial. Many
state courts have ruled in accordance with the appellate court. 190
In addition, the "clarity" of Miranda which Justice O'Connor
referred to was misdirected. The clarity of Miranda is found in the
set of warnings that must be given to suspects. As Justice Stevens
stated, Miranda clarified a suspect's minimum rights in police cus-
tody. 19' When a suspect challenges the validity of a waiver, how-
ever, courts typically make a post hoc inquiry into the totality of the
circumstances of the suspect's waiver to determine whether the
waiver was "voluntary," "knowing," and "intelligent." 192 An exam-
185 People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, -, 724 P.2d 1166, 1176, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141,
151 (1986)(holding the police could not deny suspect opportunity to meet with his re-
tained or appointed counsel who has taken steps to come to his aid before questioning
begins or resumes, and defendant's confession was inadmissible where police thwarted
his constitutional right of access to his lawyer by rebuffing retained counsel's efforts to
see him and by failing to inform him that attorney was at police station seeking to con-
sult with him).
186 See Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1143.
187 Id. at 1144.
188 Id.
189 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. See also Houston, 42 Cal. 3d at -, 724
P.2d at 1175, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 150 ("A member of the State Bar is issued a card which
identifies him as such, and any misrepresentation by an attorney is subject to
discipline.").
191 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1161-63 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
192 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979) (stating that the
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ination into whether an attorney was deceived either actively or neg-
ligently should be a relevant consideration.
Finally, Justice O'Connor's desire to avoid frustrating society's
interest in securing confessions has upset the balance between pro-
tecting society from crime and preserving individual constitutional
liberties. The majority's decision clears the way for "the police to
emasculate Miranda and the constitutional right to counsel."' 9 3 Jus-
tice O'Connor granted
that the "deliberate or reckless" witholding of information is objec-
tionable as a matter of ethics, [but] such conduct is only relevant to the'
constitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a defendant of knowl-
edge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and
the consequences of abandoning them.
194
Given that Justice O'Connor believes that what occurs outside the
presence of the suspect and unknown to him has no bearing on his
waiver,19 5 the potential for abuse by the police is great even though
the suspect is read his Miranda rights. 196 Justice O'Connor is sanc-
trial judge must examine circumstances and facts in their totality to determine whether a
valid waiver has occurred); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979) (stating that
the determination of whether an accused has knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights
depends on all the facts of each particular case).
193 Houston, 42 Cal. 3d at-, 724 P.2d at 1176, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 151. See also Brief for
Respondent at 12, Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986)(No. 84-1485). The Brief
for Respondent Burbine states:
If the police can misrepresent whether or not there will be interrogation, then they
can misrepresent when there will be interrogation. The police could tell a defense
lawyer that questioning will commence in two hours, and then start the interroga-
tion immediately. The police could also lie about where the interrogation will take
place. They could tell an attorney that interrogation will take place at the station,
and, just as the attorney arrives, they could whisk the defendant out the back door
and interrogate him or her in another location. The police could lie about whether
the defendant was in custody, telling an attorney that the client had made bail when,
in fact, the client was still being held. The police could lie about the charges against
the client, and about the court in which the defendant was to be arraigned. In short,
the police could do anything they wanted to make sure that the attorney did not
intercede prior to interrogation and, according to petitioner's argument, any decep-
tive tactics employed by the police would be forgiven by the simple expediency of
Miranda warnings.
Id.
194 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142.
195 See Id. at 1141.
196 The First Circuit recognized the potential for police abuse by stating: "If police
officers with a more than warm suspect in their custody were permitted to engage in
frustrating dissimulation with impunity, they would have to be more than human to re-
sist the temptation to mislead the suspect and his counsel." Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d
178, 187 (1st Cir. 1984). See also State v. Lohman, 707 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (Prosecuting attorney called suspect's attorney asking for permission to speak with
the suspect regarding a woman's murder. The suspect's attorney requested that nobody
should speak to his client until he talked to him. Without expressly indicating that he
would or would not honor the request, although the custom had been to honor an attor-
ney's request, the prosecutor and police interrogated the suspect.).
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tioning police abuse. The police should not be permitted to behave
in an unethical manner with impunity.
Indeed, simply limiting an inquiry of the validity of a waiver to
whether the Miranda warnings were given was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois.'97 In Brown, the Court refused to
adopt the notion that the Miranda warnings were a "cure all" for any
unconstitutional police misconduct. 198 In Moran, the majority was
overly concerned with the potential difficulties that the police would
confront in obtaining confessions. Justice O'Connor, unfortunately,
has rebalanced the Miranda doctrine and provided the police with
opportunities to abuse the interrogation process.
Justice O'Connor overemphasized the value of obtaining con-
fessions at the expense of a suspect's rights. Justice Steven's dissent
succinctly outlined Justice O'Connor's conclusion when he stated:
[i]f a lawyer is seen as a nettlesome obstacle to the pursuit of wrongdo-
ers-as in an inquisitorial society-then the Court's decision today
makes a good deal of sense. If a lawyer is seen as an aid to the under-
standing and protection of constitutional rights-as in an accusatorial
society-then today's decision makes no sense at all. 199
IV. CONCLUSION
In Moran v. Burbine, the United States Supreme Court refused to
require that the police abstain from active or reckless deception and
inform a suspect of his counsel's request to communicate with him.
According to the Court, such a requirement is neither constitution-
ally validated nor wise given the adverse effect it would have on soci-
ety's interest in obtaining voluntary admissions of guilt.
The majority emphasized the value of obtaining convictions
and placed a lesser value upon preserving the accusatory system and
constitutional liberties under the fifth amendment. Refusing to re-
quire the police to inform a suspect of his attorney's communica-
tion, while justified within a narrow interpretation of Miranda,
thwarts its spirit by limiting the protection an arrestee may be pro-
197 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
198 Id. at 602.
If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconsti-
tutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment
violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted.... Any
incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment violations would be eviscerated by making
the warnings, in effect, a "cure all," and the constitutional guarantee against unlaw-
ful searches and seizures could be said to be reduced to "a form of words."
Id. at 602-03 (citations omitted).
199 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1166 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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vided to counterbalance the compelling pressures of self-incrimina-
tion while in custodial interrogation.
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